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Who Makes the Call on Capital Punishment? How Ring 
v. Arizona Clarifies the Apprendi Rule and the 
Implications on Capital Sentencing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
State legislatures have set up capital sentencing schemes that operate 
on the outskirts of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a criminal trial by 
an impartial jury. In their attempts to reconcile the constitutional 
guarantees of the Eighth and Sixth Amendments and their interpretations 
by the Supreme Court, states have been caught between a proverbial rock 
and a hard place regarding the procedure of sentencing a defendant to 
death. The creative sentencing systems of several states are under 
scrutiny in light of the Supreme Court's most recent ruling. The impact 
of the decision has caused legislatures nationwide to get in line with the 
amorphous death penalty jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and find 
alternative solutions to capital sentencing. 
A. Background 
The constitutional right of trial by jury was upheld in a 7-2 decision 
by the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona. 1 In Ring, the Supreme Court 
held that a violation of the Sixth Amendment exists where a trial judge, 
sitting alone, enhances the maximum sentence of life in prison by 
imposing the death penalty because of "aggravating factors" that are not 
part of the elements proven for the jury's guilty verdict. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that any fact that enhances the 
maximum sentence must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt, regardless of whether the fact is an element of the offense or a 
sentencing consideration, and in so doing overruled its holding in Walton 
v. Arizona. 2 The Court also clarified and bolstered its ruling of Apprendi 
I. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). Justice Ginsberg wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices 
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, Souter, and Thomas. Justice O 'Connor dissented, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist. 
2. 497 U.S. 466 (1990). 
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v. New Jersey,3 thereby causing a frenzy of reform among state 
legislatures whose sentencing schemes came under scrutiny.4 
The types of sentencing schemes questioned were constructed by 
state legislatures in order to be in harmony with the Eighth Amendment 
requirement against "cruel and unusual punishment."5 The schemes also 
sought to be in accordance with the Court's suggestion in Gregg v. 
Georgia6 that states should apply special procedural safeguards when 
seeking the death penalty. The states argued that their sentencing 
procedures were established in line with stare decisis principles of capital 
punishment jurisprudence leading up to Walton and Apprendi. 
Although the Supreme Court reached the correct result in 
safeguarding the constitutionality of the sentencing procedure that 
imposes the ultimate penalty, it did not go far enough in providing clear 
standards for the states to follow. The ruling in Ring leaves many 
unanswered questions regarding the unanimity requirement of the jury 
during sentencing, the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors 
for imposing capital punishment, and deference to national and 
international norms and trends in this area of American jurisprudence. 
More importantly, however, the Court has established a theoretical 
foundation for a bifurcated system of prosecuting and sentencing capital 
offenses that extends the defendant's presumption of innocence into the 
sentencing realm and creates a presumption to preserve the convicted 
person's life. 
Part II of this note discusses the controversy that existed in capital 
punishment sentencing that led to the decision in Ring v. Arizona by 
tracing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of the last thirty years. Part III 
sets forth the factual background and procedural history of Ring and 
analyzes the reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV 
further analyzes the holding and considers the quantitative consequences 
and impact of Ring on the legal system. It also analyzes the qualitative 
impact on death penalty jurisprudence in the context of the roles of the 
jury in the sentencing phase and of judicial deference to national and 
world opinions of capital punishment and capital punishment's inherent 
3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
4. The constitutionality of the sentencing statute in Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 
(200 I), was stricken by the Supreme Court in Ring. The validity of similar statutes in the following 
states was also called into question: Alabama (see ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (200 I)); 
Colorado (see COLO. REV. STAT.§ 16-11-103 (2001)); Delaware (see DEL. CODE ANN., tit I I,§ 
4209 (1995)); Florida (see FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141 (West 2001)); Idaho (see IDAHO CODE § 19-
2515 (Michie 2001)); Indiana (see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West 2001); Montana (see MONT. 
CODE ANN.§ 46-18-301 (1997)); Nebraska (see NEB. REV. STAT.§ 29-2520 ( 1995)). 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
6. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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sentencing procedures. Part V briefly discusses legislative alternatives 
regarding capital sentencing statutes and schemes that should seek to be 
in harmony with Ring. 
II. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING SENTENCING SCHEMES 
States have struggled historically in drafting sentencing guidelines 
that are in compliance with the Eighth Amendment requirement to avoid 
inflicting cruel and unusual punishment by imposing the death penalty 
only on the most socially reprehensible offenses. The effort is 
complicated when the sentencing system must also conform with the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee that a criminal defendant "shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury."7 
This endeavor to create a system for imposing the death penalty that 
is fair to the accused and at the same time uses the State's resources 
efficiently is made more problematic by the amorphous jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court of the last thirty years regarding capital punishment 
and its sentencing. 
One can trace this confusion to the Supreme Court ' s decision in 
Furman v. Georgia8 where the Court effectively placed a moratorium on 
death sentences by holding capital punishment, as then practiced, 
unconstitutional. Furman, however, did not signify the end of executions 
in the United States, as anti-death penalty advocates certainly had hoped. 
The Court changed its analysis only a few years later and upheld the 
constitutionality of a reformed capital punishment statute in Gregg v. 
G . 9 eorgra. 
In Gregg , the Court held that capital punishment did not always 
violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that retribution and 
possible deterrence of future capital crimes were sufficient reasons to 
allow the imposition of death as a penalty. 10 Under the Georgia 
sentencing scheme at issue in Gregg, a prerequisite for imposing the 
death penalty required specific jury findings of aggravating and 
mitigating factors such as the circumstances of the crime or the character 
of the defendant. The Georgia Supreme Court, in addition to considering 
the legal issues on appeal, would also compare each capital sentence with 
the sentences imposed on defendants similarly situated in order to avoid 
a "wanton and freakish imposition of the death penalty." 11 
7. U.S . CONST. amend. VI. 
8. 408 u.s. 238, 238 (1 972). 
9. 428 U.S. 153,207 (1976). 
10. /d. at !83. 
II. /d. at 224. 
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The Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence was further 
muddled by later decisions in Walton v. Arizona, 12 Jones v. United 
States, 13 and Apprendi v. New Jersey. 14 The Walton Court, in deciding 
the constitutionality of the same statute at issue in Ring, held that the 
state was not required to designate certain aggravating factors as 
"elements" of the underlying offense in order to impose the death 
penalty. 15 More importantly, the highly divided Court also held that 
Arizona was not required to allow only the jury to determine the 
existence of the aggravating factors. 16 The ruling in Walton, therefore, 
left open the possibility for capital punishment to be solely at the 
discretion of the sentencing judge who, sitting alone, could find the 
presence of aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence and 
sentence the accused to death. 
The issue and rule in Walton proved to be very divisive for the high 
Court. In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court heard arguments 
relating to the statutory interpretation of a sentencing scheme that 
permitted sentencing enhancements to be made by the judge when no 
recommendation to add to the sentence was included in the indictment. 17 
The Court explained the limitations on judiciary sentencing by giving a 
thorough historical background and holding that the limitations on judges 
regarding sentencing enhancements were based on the Due Process 
Clause and the Sixth Amendment that require "any fact (other than prior 
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty of a crime must be 
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 18 The Supreme Court also held that the states may not 
circumvent the due process limitations of In re Winship 19 by not 
presenting facts to the juries that increase the severity of the possible 
penalty.2° Finally, the Jones Court reiterated that the general rule 
continues to be that every fact that might expand the statutory maximum 
penalty must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 21 
12. 497 U.S. 639 ( 1990). 
13. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
14. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
15. Walton, 497 U.S. at647. This case was decided by a narrow 5-4 majority. 
16. !d. 
17. Jones, 526 U.S. at 232. 
18. /d. at 243 n.6. 
19. 397 U.S. 358 ( 1970). The Supreme Court clarified the due process limitations in criminal 
cases by holding that the government must prove beyond a reasonab le doubt every element of the 
crime for which the defendant is accused. !d. at 364. 
20. Jones, 526 U.S. at 240-41 . 
21. !d. at 248-49. 
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The Apprendi Court confirmed the opinion it expressed in Jones and 
held that the constitutional protections of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments require that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."22 The majority considered that 
the answer to the issue of whether judge or jury makes the call 
conceming sentencing enhancement was foreshadowed in Jones, where 
the Court noted that the aggravating facts must be submitted to the jury 
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.23 The Apprendi majority, like the 
majority in Jones, also relied on the "historic link between verdict and 
judgment and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate 
within the limits of the legal penalties."24 Moreover, the Apprendi Court 
believed that "[t]he judge's role in sentencing is constrained at its outer 
limits by the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury."25 
States have been given a confusing and ever-changing constitutional 
roadmap regarding the imposition of the death penalty because of the 
holdings of Walton, Jones, and Apprendi. These cases have also made it 
more difficult for the states to reconcile constitutional guarantees with 
procedural safeguards in order to avoid an "arbitrary" and "freakish" 
death penalty.26 The divisive issue of who makes the call- judge or 
jury-to enhance the statutory maximum sentence was again taken up by 
the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona. This time, the issue included the 
question of what the constitutional procedural safeguards are surrounding 
the imposition ofthe ultimate penalty. 
Ill. RING V. ARIZONA: THE STATUTE, THE FACTS, AND THE HOLDINGS 
A. Background 
1. The statute 
At issue in Ring was an Arizona sentencing statute which directed 
the trial judge to "conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the 
existence ... of [certain enumerated] circumstances ... for the purpose 
of determining the sentence to be imposed."27 The statute further directed 
22. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000). 
21 Jones, 526 U.S. at 248-49. 
24. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482. 
25. Jd. at 483 n.1 0. 
26. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). 
27. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2434 (2002) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
703(C) (West 2001)). 
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that "[t]he hearing shall be conducted before the court alone ... [and] the 
court alone shall make all factual determinations" required by the 
sentencing statute, the United States Constitution, or the Constitution of 
the State of Arizona.28 
The sentencing procedure under this regime, therefore, required that 
a defendant could not be put to death unless there were additional 
findings of fact to the essential elements of the underlying offense. The 
sentencing considerations under this sentencing procedure required that 
the findings of fact be found by a preponderance of the evidence 
following a guilty verdict by the jury. 
2. Thefacts 
Timothy Ring, James Greenham, and William Ferguson hijacked a 
Wells Fargo armored truck on November 28, 1994, when one of the 
couriers left the van to get money from a department store.29 The truck 
and its driver were later found by the police. The driver was found inside 
the truck, fatally wounded by a single gun shot to the head . "[M]ore than 
$562,000 in cash and $271,000 in checks were missing from the van."30 
Timothy Ring was the accused shooter and mastermind of the plot. 31 
3. Procedural history 
a. Arizona trial court. "The trial judge instructed the jury on 
alternative charges of premeditated murder and felony murder" in 
connection with the armed robbery. 32 "The jury deadlocked on the 
premeditated murder offense, with 6 of the 12 jurors voting to acquit" 
Ring.33 The jury returned a guilty verdict for the felony murder charge, 
which is a first-degree murder under Arizona law.34 
Following the procedure dictated by § 13-703, the trial judge, sitting 
alone, entered his "Special Verdict, sentencing Ring to death. "35 The 
judge's findings recognized "that Ring was eligible for the death penalty 
only if he was [the driver' s] actual killer or if he was 'a major participant 
28. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-703(C) (West 2001 ). 
29. Ring , 122 S. Ct. at 2432. 
30. !d. at 2433. 
31. !d. at 2435 . 
32. !d. at 2433. 
33. ld 
34. !d. at 2433-34 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-IIOS(A)-(B) (West 200 I)). 
35. !d. at 2435. 
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in the armed robbery that led to the killing and exhibited a reckless 
disregard or indifference for human life. '"36 
During the sentencing hearing, one of Ring's associates testified 
against him and pointed him out as the leader of the offense who plotted 
and executed the robbery and the subsequent murder of the driver.37 
After the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, two of the enumerated aggravating factors necessary to 
sentence Ring to death.38 "First, the judge determined that Ring had 
committed the offense in expectation of receiving something of 
'pecuniary value,' as described in § 13-703 .... Second, the judge found 
that the offense was committed in an especially heinous, cruel or 
depraved manner. "39 
b. Arizona Supreme Court. "On appeal, Ring argued that the capital 
sentencing scheme in Arizona violated his Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights ... because it entrusts to a judge the finding of a fact 
raising the defendant's maximum penalty."40 His constituti9nal attack of 
the sentencing scheme was based on the apparent irreconcilability of 
Walton, Jones, and Apprendi. 
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's findings, 
noting that the United States Supreme Court had upheld the sentencing 
system as constitutional in Walton v. Arizona.41 Moreover, the Arizona 
Supreme Court also stated that Walton and Apprendi remained good law 
and that it was bound to follow those rulings due to stare decisis 
principles. 
The state high court, however, made two notable observations 
regarding Apprendi and Jones . First, the court said that Apprendi and 
Jones "'raise[d] some questions about the continued viability of 
Walton',"42 notably that the majority in Jones and Apprendi refused to 
expressly overrule Walton. Thus, Walton remained the controlling 
authority on point, and "the apparent scope of Apprendi and Jones [was] 
not as broad as some of the language of the two opinions suggest[ ed]. "43 
Second, the Arizona Supreme Court examined the Apprendi majority's 
36. !d. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a-47a; and citing Tison v. Arizona, 48 1 U.S. 137 
( 1987) ("holding that Eighth Amendment pem1its execution of fe lony-murder defendant, who did 
not kill or attempt to kill, but who was a 'major participa[nt] in the felony committed ' and who 
demonstrated ' reckless indifference to human life "')) . 
37. /d. 
38. ld 
39. ld (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a). 
40. /d. at 2436. 
4!. ld 
42. /d. (citing State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1150 (2001)). 
43. See State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1150. 
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interpretation of state law and noted that Apprendi "described Arizona's 
sentencing system as one that 'required judges, after a jury verdict 
holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating 
factors before imposing a sentence of death,' and not as a system that 
'permit[ed] a judge to determine the existence of a factor which makes a 
crime a capital offense. "'44 
The Arizona Supreme Court distinguished this case in form, seeking 
to uphold the sentencing scheme on the grounds that the judicial fact-
finding during the sentencing portion of the trial was not for elements of 
the underlying offense, but rather were sentencing factors for 
establishing punishment. Furthermore, the court noted that the Apprendi 
dissent "squarely rejected" the Walton ruling with regards to the 
sentencing scheme insofar that "[a] defendant convicted of first-degree 
murder in Arizona cannot receive a death sentence unless a judge makes 
the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists. 
Without that critical finding, the maximum sentence to which the 
defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and not the death penalty."45 
"The Arizona high court concluded that" the sentencing scheme at 
issue is "precisely as described in Justice O'Connor's dissent" in 
Apprendi and that Ring 's death sentence required judicial fact-finding.46 
Despite the court's reading of Arizona law, the court "was bound by the 
Supremacy Clause" to apply Walton, which had not been overruled, and 
finally "rejected Ring's constitutional attack on [Arizona's] capital 
murder judicial sentencing system."47 
B. United States Supreme Court Opinions 
The United States Supreme Court granted Ring's petition for a writ 
of certiorari in order to "allay uncertainty in the lower courts caused by 
the manifest tension between Walton and the reasoning of Apprendi.'-48 
In a seven to two split, the majority decided the following question: 
Whether the aggravating factor(s) that allow the imposition of the death 
44. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436 (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1 151 ). 
45. !d. 
46. /d. (citing State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 279). 
47. ld 
48. !d. The Court cited several C ircuit Court of Appeals dec isions that raised questi ons about 
reconciling Walton with the Apprendi rule, including: United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150. 159-
160 (4th Cir. 2001 ) (en bane) ("calling the continued authority of Walton in light of Apprendi 
' perplex ing, " ' Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436); Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 542 (9th Cir. 200 1) 
(stating that "Apprendi may raise some doubt about Walton," Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436); People v. 
Kaczmarek, 741 N.E.2d 11 3 1, 11 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000) (arguing, "(W]hilc it appears 
Apprendi extends greater constitutional protections to noncapital, rather than capita l, defendants. the 
Court has endorsed this precise principle, and we arc in no pos ition to second-guess that decision 
here." Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436-37). 
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penalty may be found by the trial judge, sitting alone, or whether the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee to a jury trial requires the factor(s) to be 
found by an impartial jury.49 
1. Majority and concurrences 
The majority began its discussion by mentioning the ruling of 
Walton, which upheld the sentencing scheme in Arizona because, 
according to Hildwin v. Florida, "the Sixth Amendment does not require 
that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of 
death be made by the jury."50 The Walton Court reasoned that under the 
Arizona statute and sentencing scheme, the aggravating factors were not 
essential elements of the underlying offense required to be found by the 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, "they ranked as 'sentencing 
considerations' guiding the choice between life and death."51 
The Ring majority paid special attention to Justice Stevens's dissent 
in Walton where he "urged that the Sixth Amendment requires 'a jury 
determination of facts that must be established before the death penalty 
may be imposed. "'52 The Walton dissent reasoned, and the Ring majority 
agreed, that the aggravating factors at issue operated as statutory 
elements of capital murder under Arizona law and the death penalty 
would be unavailable in their absence. 53 Therefore, the aggravating 
factors were required to be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 54 
The majority also relied on the historical background of jury 
sentencing, reasoning that if the question had been raised in 1791, when 
the Sixth Amendment had been drafted, it would have been clearly 
answered. Again, relying on Stevens's dissent in Walton, the Court noted 
that in the late 18th Century 
the jury had the power to determine not only whether the defendant was 
guilty of homicide but also the degree of the offense. Moreover, the 
jury's role infindingfacts that would determine a homicide defendant's 
eligibility ./(>r capital punishment was particularly well established. 
Throughout its history, the jury determined which homicide defendants 
49. Ring. 122 S. Ct. at 2432. 
50. /d. at 2437 (quoting Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 
640-641 )) 
5 1. !d. (citing Walton, 497 U.S. at 648). A year before Walton, the Court had denied a Sixth 
Amendment challenge to Florida's capital sentencing scheme, in which the jury recommends a 
sentence. but makes no explicit fact finding on the presence of aggravating circumstances. See 
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 63S ( 1989). 
52. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2438 (citing Walwn, 497 U.S. at 709). 
53. !d. 
54. ld 
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would be subject to capital punishment by making factual 
determinations, many of which related to difficult assessments of the 
defendant's state of mind. By the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, 
the jury' s right to make these determinations was unqucstioned 5 5 
This historical perspective, the Court found, favored Ring 's 
argument of his Sixth Amendment right and his constitutional attack of 
the Arizona sentencing scheme. 
The Ring Court upheld the constitutional attack because it fell 
squarely under the Apprendi rule and the reasoning of Jones. The 
Apprendi rule is, in large part, a derivative of the position of the Court in 
Jones, where the majority clearly explained that the Constitution 
guarantees that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the 
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, 
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."56 The 
Apprendi Court also clarified that the dispositive question "is one not of 
form, but of effect,"57 reasoning that "[i]f a State makes an increase in a 
defendant 's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, 
that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt."5x Justice Scalia noted in his concurring 
opinion that "all the facts which must exist in order to subject the 
defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury" 
regardless whether the facts , i.e., aggravating factors, were labeled 
elements of the offense or sentencing considerations or any permutation 
ofboth.5Y 
The Ring majority asserted that the Arizona Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Apprendi rule overlooked the essential standard that 
"the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect. "6° Furthermore, the 
Court reasoned, if the State's interpretation of the Apprendi rule was 
upheld, the rule would be rendered "a 'meaningless and formalistic' rule 
of statutory drafting"6 1 which would not resolve the tension between 
Walton and Apprendi. 
The Supreme Court noted that the Apprendi rule emphatically 
instructs that "the characterization of a fact or circumstance as an 
'element' or a 'sentencing factor' is not determinative of the question 
55. !d. (citing Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penaltv: The Scope of" a CapiTal 
Def"endant 's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAM I' L.REV. 1, I 0-11 ( 1 9X9)). 
56. Jones v. Un ited States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 ( 1999). 
57. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S . 466, 494 (2000). 
58. Ring, 122 S. Ct . at 2439. 
59. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499. 
60. !d. at 494 . 
61. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2441 (citing Apprendi. 530 U.S. at 541 ). 
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'who decides,' judge or jury."62 Rather, the Apprendi Court ruled that 
"[ w ]hen the term 'sentence enhancement' is used to describe an increase 
beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the 
. ' ·1 d. " 63 JUry s gm ty ver 1ct. -
In addition to the Apprendi rule, the Ring majority relied on stare 
decisis principles to overrule Walton and strike down the Arizona capital 
sentencing scheme. The Court referred back to Maynard v. Cartwright,64 
where the Court held that "[s]ince Furman, our cases have insisted that 
the channeling and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the 
death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently 
minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."65 In more 
recent cases, the Court explained that it had "interpreted the Constitution 
to require the addition of an element or elements to the definition of a 
criminal offense in order to narrow its scope."66 It continued to explain 
that "[i]f a legislature responded to one of these decisions by adding the 
element we held constitutionally required, surely the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee would apply to that element."67 
Countering Arizona's argument that judicial authority over finding 
aggravating factors would be a better way to safeguard against arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty, the majority reasoned that the Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury trial "does not tum on the relative 
rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders."68 The Court 
also noted that "the superiority of judicial factfinding in capital cases is 
far from evident" and that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme is in the 
minority to the other states that impose the death penalty and that have 
"responded to this Court's Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the 
presence of aggravating circumstances in capital cases by entrusting 
those determinations to the jury."69 
62. Jd 
63. !d. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19). 
64. 486 U.S. 356 ( 1988). See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522-23. 
65. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362. 
66. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2442. See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 56 1-62 (1995) 
(suggesting that the addition of an "express jurisdictional element" to a federal gun possession 
statute would render the statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause). 
67. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2442. 
6K fd. 
69. !d. The majority found that 29 of the 38 States that impose capital punishment generally 
commit sentencing decisions to juries. Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska entrust the 
judge with capi tal sentenc ing factfinding and the ultimate deci sion to impose the death penalty. 
Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana have "hybrid" sentencing schemes in which the jury 
returns an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate determination for imposing capital 
punishment. ld at 2442 n.6. 
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The majority finally ruled that the Sixth Amendment requires that 
the jury must find any aggravating factors that determine capital 
punishment, particularly under Arizona's capital sentencing regime, 
because the "enumerated aggravating factors operate as the 'functional 
equivalent"' of elements of the underlying offense.70 The Court also 
warned that "[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the 
factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, 
but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death."71 
Justice Scalia concurred that Walton needed to be overturned in 
order to avoid further tension with Apprendi. He reluctantly explained 
that the Supreme Court had caused the problem in the first place, noting 
that "[w]hat compelled Arizona (and many other states) to specify 
particular 'aggravating factors' that must be found before the death 
penalty can be imposed . .. was the line of this Court's cases beginning 
with Furman v. Georgia."72 In other words, Scalia complained that the 
issue had become troublesome because the Supreme Court had coerced 
the states into developing a sentencing scheme using aggravating factors 
to narrow the field of murderers eligible for death, beginning with 
Furman and continuing through Apprendi. 
Scalia expressed that the line of decisions since Furman "had no 
proper foundation in the Constitution," and it would have been " [b Jetter 
for the Court to have invented an evidentiary requirement that a judge 
can find by a preponderance of the evidence" than to bring jurors into the 
picture. 73 Even so, he agreed with the majority that "the fundamental 
meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all 
facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant 
receives .. . must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt," 
regardless of what the states label those facts-i.e .. elements of the 
offense or sentencing factors. 74 
Scalia admitted in concurring that he is bothered by "the accelerating 
propensity of both state and federal legislatures to adopt 'sentencing 
factors' determined by judges that increase punishment beyond what is 
authorized by the jury's verdict."75 The observation of this trend led him 
70. /d. at 2443. 
71. !d. 
72. !d. at 2444. 
73. ld 
74. ld 
75. ld at 2445. 
323] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 335 
to believe that "our people's traditional belief in the right of trial by jury 
is in perilous decline."76 
In a terse concurrence, Justice Kennedy expressed his opinion that 
Apprendi had been wrongly decided, but now that it is the law "its 
holding must be implemented in a principled way."77 Justice Breyer also 
concurred in the judgment and reasoned that the Supreme Court in Gregg 
v. Georgia had held that the Eighth Amendment "requires the states to 
apply special procedural safeguards when they seek the death penalty," 
and that those safeguards include a requirement that "a jury impose any 
sentence of death."7R 
Although Justice Breyer concurred with the majority, he was 
troubled by "the continued difficulty of justifying capital punishment in 
terms of its ability to deter crime, incapacitate offenders, or rehabilitate 
criminals."79 He offered five reasons as to why the death penalty, as 
currently administered, should be abandoned. Those reasons can be 
summarized as follows: (I) The death penalty is irreversible, and this 
irreversibility is especially egregious when the defendant is wrongfully 
convicted, as is "underscored by the continued division of opinion" and 
recent DNA testing which showed that many capital crime convictions 
had proved unreliable;80 (2) the "potentially arbitrary application" of the 
death penalty as demonstrated by the seemingly important factors of race 
and socioeconomic background of the defendant in death penalty 
convictions;81 (3) the "delays that increasingly accompany sentences of 
death make those sentences unconstitutional because of 'the suffering 
inherent in a prolonged wait for execution"';82 (4) inadequate 
representation in capital defenses aggravates the other shortcomings 
mentioned above;83 and (5) "other nations have increasingly abandoned 
capital punishment."84 Justice Breyer concluded that "the danger of 
76. ld 
77.ld 
78. Jd at 2446 (citing Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,515 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
79. !d 
80. !d at 2447. 
8 1. !d Justice Breyer presented information that showed a "'pattern of evidence indicating 
racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty."' !d (citing U.S. 
General Accounting Oflice, Report to Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary: Death Penalty 
Sentencing 5 (Feb. 1990)). 
82. !d at 2448 (citing Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999)). 
83. !d 
84. !d Justice Breyer commented on the disparity between the imposition of the death 
penalty in the United States as it compares worldwide and noted "that other nations have 
increasingly abandoned capital punishment." ld He offers several sources in support of this 
proposition. 
See, e.g., San Martin, US. Taken to Task Over Death Penalty, MIAMI HERALD, May 31 , 
200 I, p. I (United States is only Western industrialized Nation that authorizes the death 
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unwarranted imposition of the penalty cannot be avoided unless 'the 
decision to impose the death penalty is made by a jury rather than by a 
single governmental official. ,xs Justice Breyer expressed his concerns 
regarding the flaws of the American capital sentencing system but 
offered guidance with regards to reforming the current sentencing 
standards to better ensure constitutional guarantees. 
2. The dissent 
Justice O 'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented for the same 
reasons they dissented in Apprendi. They argued in Ring that the "rule 
that any fact that increases the maximum penalty must be treated as an 
element of the crime is not required by the Constitution, by history, or by 
[the Supreme Court's) prior cases."86 
The dissent expressed concern over the "severely destabilizing 
effect" that the rule in Ring will have on the criminal justice system and 
predicted that the number of appeals before the courts due to Apprendi 
would grow even worse.87 The dissent's worry, however, that the ruling 
in Ring will cause "an enormous increase in the workload of an already 
overburdened judiciary" overlooks the fact that constitutional guarantees, 
and the preservation of human life, should always trump inconvenience 
and overtime hours by the judiciary. 88 
Jd 
penalty); Amnesty International Website Aga inst the Death Penalty, Facts and Figures on 
the Death Penalty, (2002) http://www.web.amnesty.org/nnp/dplibrary.nsf (since Gregg, 
II I countries have ei ther abandoned the penalty a ltogether, reserved it only for 
exceptional crimes like wartime crimes, or have not carried out executions for at least the 
past 10 years); De Young, Group Criticizes U.S. on Detainee Policy; Amnesty Warns of 
Human Rights Fallout, WASH INGTON POST, May 28, 2002, p. A4 (the United Slates rates 
fourth in number of executions, after China, Iran, and Saud i Arabia) . 
85. !d. (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,469 ( 1984)). 
86. /d. at 2449. See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 524-52 (2000). 
87. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2449. Justice O'Connor noted that there are 168 death row inmates in 
the fi ve states affected by Ring (Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska , and Arizona) , and stated that 
"each of whom is now li kely challenge hi s or her death sentence." /d. Also, there are 529 prisoners 
on death row in the States whose capital sentencing schemes were ca lled into question. Those states 
include Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana. /d. at 2450. 
88. /d. at 2449. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND lMPLICA TIONS 
A. Quantitative Impact 
The nme states affected by the ruling m Ring account for 
approximately 797 of the nation's 3,700 death row inmates.89 Justice 
O'Connor notes that approximately 697 people have been sentenced to 
die under the capital sentencing schemes that were invalidated or called 
into question by Ring.90 The impact of the Supreme Court's decision has 
led some prosecutors to worry that "the weight of the system is going to 
crush [them]."91 With regards to legislative reform, the states most 
affected by Ring are now busy devising strategies that will keep the 
convicted on death row and avoid a snowball effect of litigation.92 
The states anticipate that the ruling in Ring will likely bring an 
increase in capital punishment litigation in the lower courts, particularly 
as the persons awaiting execution appeal their capital sentences, attack 
the constitutionality of the sentencing statutes and schemes, and ask for a 
re-sentencing or even a re-trial. This anticipated docket load on an 
already overworked judicial system should act as an impetus for state 
legislatures to conform their capital sentencing standards to the 
constitutional guarantees of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, as well as keeping with the Ring triad.93 
There are important qualitative effects as a result of Ring. An 
important consequence is the theoretical establishment of a bifurcated 
system of prosecuting and sentencing capital offenses. This system is 
predicated on constitutional guarantees, the defendant's presumption of 
innocence and of life, the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors 
in sentencing, and deference to the national and international opinion. 
The following sections discuss these qualitative effects in more detail. 
R9. See John Gibeau!, States Revisit Death Sentence Cases: Prosecutors Look to Presen'e 
Capital Rulings in wake of High Court Decision, I AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 
EREPORT 25 (June 28, 2002). 
90. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2449-50. Justice O'Connor accounts that there are 168 prisoners on 
death row in the five states whose capital sentencing schemes were declared unconstitutional. Those 
states are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho. Montana, and Nebraska. She also accounts for 529 more death 
row inmates in Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana, whose hybrid capital sentencing systems 
were called into question. The capital sentencing scheme in the second set of states is considered 
hybrid because the jury renders an advisory verdict regarding punishment, but the judge makes the 
ultimate sentencing determination. 
91. See Gibeau!, supra note 89 (quoting Jerry M. Blair, president of the Florida Prosecuting 
Attorneys Association). 
92. !d 
93. I use the term "'Ring triad" to mean the mlings of Ring, Apprendi, and Jones. 
338 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVII 
B. Constitutional Guarantees and the Presumption ofLile 
The rulings from Ring, Apprendi, and Jones facilitate procedures that 
maintain the preeminence of the constitutional guarantees of the Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in both capital and non-capital 
criminal cases. The Ring triad establishes a theoretical foundation of a 
bifurcated system of prosecuting and sentencing capital offenses. This 
bifurcated system is predicated upon the principle of presumption of 
innocence of the defendant and broadens this presumption to preserving 
the life of the convicted offender. 
A bifurcated system is a procedural safeguard of the constitutional 
guarantees of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in capital 
cases. There are two phases or rounds in a bifurcated system. The first is 
a trial phase where the state must prove that the defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the underlying offense. This 
initial phase is a standard of the American criminal justice system. The 
second phase involves sentencing the convicted defendant to die. The 
threshold for imposing capital punishment would require the prosecution 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the state is justified in 
sentencing the defendant to death. This sentencing scheme would take 
Blackstone's postulate that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape 
than one innocent suffer"94 to the echelon that it would be better for ten 
guilty persons live in prison than one die innocently. 
The presumption that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty is 
the benchmark of the American justice system. This presumption is taken 
one step further in light of Ring. While the presumption of innocence is 
in keeping with the Due Process guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it naturally carries over to sentencing. The presumption 
becomes that the defendant should get life in prison unless the state 
proves beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating factors 
that would convert life imprisonment into capital punishment. In other 
words, the state must prove that the defendant's conviction leads to the 
imposition of capital punishment only when the aggravating factors are 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, overcoming the 
presumption of life would determine that death is the appropriate 
punishment for the convicted defendant and the particular offense. 95 
94. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. 
95. See generallv Beth S. Brinkmann, Note, The Presumption o/Li/e: A Starting Pointji>r a 
Due Process Analysis of" Capital Sentencing, 94 YALE L.J. 351 ( 1984). 
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C. The Jury and Weighing of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in 
Sentencing 
Even if the presumption of life is carried out in the sentencing phase, 
there still remains an important issue that is left unanswered by Ring. 
The question involves how the jury will consider any aggravating and 
mitigating factors during sentencing. This is a particularly difficult issue 
for legislatures to resolve, and it is imperative that the method of 
weighing factors will ultimately result in the imposition of punishment 
that guarantees the defendant's constitutional rights. 
Whether aggravating and mitigating factors are balanced against one 
another or as a whole will depend on how much weight each factor 
carries. Ring leaves several unanswered questions that are at the heart of 
capital sentencing and the role of the juries in deciding whether or not to 
impose the death penalty. Among these unanswered questions is whether 
one mitigating factor outweighs an aggravating factor and vice-versa. 
Also, would one aggravating factor outweigh two or more "smaller" 
mitigating factors? Or should the aggravating and mitigating facts be 
balanced as a whole? Also, should the jury find the aggravating and 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of 
the evidence before deciding a sentence? Lastly, is the role of the jury in 
capital sentencing advisory or conclusive? In other words, does Ring 
allow the sentencing judge to divert from the jury findings? 
In order to comply with the constitutional guarantees of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, and in light of Ring, the jury should 
consider the relevance of the aggravating factor vis-a-vis the mitigating 
factor with respect to the underlying offense. This would ensure that 
whatever factors the jury considers during sentencing are given a 
relevant value to the individual defendant and the particular crime. This 
method would be like a cost-benefit analysis with a social utility 
undercurrent in the sense that the social utility would be avoiding the 
imposition of an arbitrary punishment. 
Convicting the defendant requires that the underlying offense be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard of proof should carry 
over to the sentencing phase where aggravating and mitigating factors 
will be considered in determining the punishment. The reason that the 
standard of proof is at its highest level during prosecution is due to the 
value the criminal justice system places on the freedom and social stigma 
of conviction. Similarly, the moral and social value of the life of the 
convicted person mandates that the decision to execute the offender 
should be reached using the highest level of scrutiny. 
If the jury finds sufficient aggravating factors to put the defendant to 
death, that decision should be reached unanimously. This procedural 
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requirement is grounded on similar principles for finding guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt in capital offenses. lt would also demonstrate that the 
jury's finding for imposing the death penalty has undergone strict 
consideration and that the sentence is deemed the appropriate 
punishment in the eyes of the jurors. 
Even if the jury unanimously finds sufficient aggravating factors for 
imposing the death penalty, the question remains whether the jury's 
findings are advisory or conclusive and whether the sentencing judge is 
bound to follow those findings. Under the Florida sentencing scheme, for 
example, the jury renders an advisory verdict regarding punishment and 
the sentencing judge retains discretionary power to make the ultimate 
determination. In light of Ring, however, such a sentencing scheme 
would be considered unconstitutional. For this reason, juries should issue 
a final capital sentencing verdict that the judge could only invalidate if it 
is outrageously inappropriate or if he has reason to believe the jury is not 
impartial as directed by the Sixth Amendment. 
A viable alternative to protect the defendant's due process and equal 
protection rights in capital sentencing would include weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating factors regarding their relevance to the crime 
and defendant and issuing a non-advisory and unanimous sentencing 
verdict. The ultimate issue remains whether such a scheme would protect 
the defendant from undergoing cruel and unusual punishment. This 
question can be answered by paying reasonable deference to national 
trends and world opinion of capital sentencing and its attached 
punishment. 
D. Deference to National and International Opinion 
The rhetoric from the Supreme Court is that it does not engage in 
judicial activism, but a careful reflection of the Court's recent docket 
suggests that the Court is an activist bench.96 The Court has historically 
considered trends and public perceptions concerning national issues and 
has decided to be proactive in engaging in the dialogue, if not deciding 
its outcome.97 The role of national trends regarding capital sentencing 
would necessarily include confronting public opinion of the sentencing 
schemes, the increased use of DNA testing in capital crime prosecutions, 
and the propensity of executing capital punishments across the nation. 
Although the Court is by no means accountable to public opinion, it 
should reasonably consider national trends regarding the death penalty, 
96. See Bush v. Gore, 53 I U.S. 98 (2000). 
97. See generally id: Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. I 13 (1973); Trop v. Dulles .. 356 U.S 86 (1958), 
and Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (I 955). 
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i.e., determining the national view of cruel and unusual punishment and 
whether or not the capital sentencing mechanisms are conducive to 
uphold constitutional standards. Undoubtedly, the resulting opinions are 
gross generalizations of American standards. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has held that the Eighth Amendment contains "an evolving 
standard of decency that mark[s] the progress of a maturing society."n In 
order to determine what that "evolving standard" is , with regards to 
capital sentencing and punishment, the Court should consider national 
views and trends. 
Just as the Court should pay reasonable deference to national trends 
and the evolution of a national consensus, it should consider world 
opinion regarding capital sentencing and punishment. Deference to world 
opinion is not novel to the Supreme Court. In its last Term, the Supreme 
Court heard Atkins v. Virginia and held that executing the mentally 
retarded equated to cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of the 
Eight Amendment. 99 The Court's reasoning in Atkins notably referred to 
the global opinion opposing the execution of adults who had the mental 
capacity of a child. Also, the Court expressly looked to international 
practices and opinion to assess what constitutes "evolving standards of 
decency" for Eighth Amendment purposes in its holding in Trap v. 
Dulles. 100 Likewise, the Court should consider international trends with 
respect to capital sentencing schemes and standards. 
International principles in private and public international law, in 
addition to widely-accepted international norms, have historically been a 
part of our domestic jurisprudence dating back to the nation's founding 
and the earliest vestiges of English common law.101 More importantly, 
the Supreme Court has paid deference to world opinion in the past in 
deciding benchmark cases.102 In 1900, Justice Gray explained that 
" international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice . ... [W]here there is no treaty, and 
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort 
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations." 103 
98. See Trop , 351i U.S. 86. 
99 . 122 S. Ct. 2242,2252 (2002) . 
I 00. 356 U.S. at I 0 I. 
I 0 I . Set! Haro ld Hongju Koh, Edward L. Barrell . Jr. Lecture On Constitutional Law:, 35 
U.C. D AV IS l. REV. 1085, 1095 (2002). 
102. See Trop, 356 U.S. 81i . See al.<o Reyno lds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, lli4 ( 1878) 
(stating that "[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of 
Europe." Koh, supra note I 0 I, at n .50); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 ( 1988) (the 
majority evaluated the standards of executing minors in the Soviet Union and Western European 
nations and took particularly careful note of the views of "other nations that share our Anglo-
American heritage." Koh. supra note 101. at 1099). 
103. The Paquete Hahana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900). 
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Statistics are a reflection of the international opinion regarding 
capital punishment. These statistics are stunning. For example, over 
3,048 people were executed worldwide in 2001, an increase from I ,457 
in 2000. 104 Four countries conducted 90% of these executions-China, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. 105 Only six countries have 
publicly executed juveniles since 1990-Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Yemen, and the United States. 106 As of this year, I 08 out of more 
than 180 countries in the world have abolished the death penalty in law 
or practice. 107 "European regional organizations have made abolition of 
the death penalty a prerequisite to joining the new Europe, and a 
cornerstone of European human rights policy."108 
Paying deference to international opinion- whether it is in the form 
of public, private, or customary international law; or in the form of 
global trends and norms- draws into question the enterprise of capital 
punishment and the sentencing schemes behind it. Justice Blackmun, 
shortly before his retirement from the Supreme Court, noted that 
" [i]nternational law can and should inform the interpretation of various 
clauses of the Constitution, notably the Due Process Clause and the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments." 109 With regards to the intent of the Eighth Amendment, 
Blackmun stated that "[t]he drafters ... were concerned, at root, with 
'the dignity of man,' and understood that 'evolving standards of 
decency' should be measured, in part, against international norms. " 110 
More importantly, "the Court has looked to both domestic custom and 
the 'climate of international opinion' to determine what punishments are 
cruel and unusual."''' 
International opinion has formed the Supreme Court's understanding 
of the social values of the nation from the founding. The Court has 
internalized international law, norms, and trends in order to ascertain the 
evolving standards that characterize an enlightened or "civilized 
society." This deference to world opinion is not exclusive to maritime or 
transactional law, but carries over to reconciling the capital punishment 
104. Press Release, Amnesty International , Worldwide Executions Doubled in 2001 (Sept. 4, 
2002), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/world04092002.html. 
I 05. !d. 
106. ld 
I 07. See Death Penalty Information Center, at http ://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicintl.html 
(last visited Dec. 4. 2002). 
I 08. See Koh, supra note I 0 I, at II 05. 
I 09. Harry A. Blackmun. Tribute: The Supreme Court and the Law of11/ations, 104 YALE L.J. 
39, 45 (1994). 
II 0. ld at 45-46. 
II I. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n. I 0 (1977). 
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question, and its mechanisms for sentencing, with the social utility of the 
penalty. 
V. CONCLUSION : UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE 
ALTERNATIVES 
The ruling of Ring raises an important unresolved issue. The 
question is whether the aggravating factors in the sentencing statutes 
should be reconsidered or reformatted to become elements of the 
underlying capital offense and charged as such. The uncertainty of this 
question means that lower courts are already dealing with the fallout 
from the Ring triad. 112 Although this note does not analyze the effect of 
this question, the ruling from Ring provides a viable framework whereby 
drafting capital sentencing schemes should more closely conform with 
constitutional guarantees to ensure that the death penalty is not cruel, 
unusual, arbitrary, or otherwise freakish. 
There are capital sentencing statutes that would arguably pass muster 
under the Ring triad standard. 113 These schemes, however, are the 
exception rather than the rule. The Arkansas statute, for example, sets a 
high standard for imposition of the death penalty. The sentencing statute 
reads in pertinent part: "The jury shall impose a sentence of death if it 
unanimously returns written findings that: ( 1) Aggravating circumstances 
exist beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Aggravating circumstances 
outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found 
to exist; and (3) Aggravating circumstances justify a sentence of death 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 114 
The Arkansas statute provides an example of procedural safeguards 
that the Ring Court sought to uphold. The sentencing scheme involves 
the role of the jury in weighing aggravating factors and applies the 
highest standard of proof in detennining the ultimate life or death of the 
convicted person. The attempt to construct a sentencing scheme that 
imposes the death penalty that complies with constitutional standards is 
an overwhelming and worthwhile endeavor. It becomes the hope of the 
judicial and legislative branches to create a procedural system that does 
not become a "machinery of death .. . [that] lessens us all." 115 
Simon Cantarero 
11 2. See United States v. Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D.Va. 2002); United States v. Lentz, 
225 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D.Va. 2002); Sanchez v . Superior Court, 126 Ca l. Rptr. 2d 200 (Ca l. 2d Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002); and Bottoson v. Moore, No. SC02-1455, 2002 WL 31 386790 (Fla. Oct. 24, 2002). 
II J See ARK. CODE A NN.§ 5-4-603 (Michie 1987). 
114. ld at § 5-4-603(a)( I )-(3 ). 
11 5. Callins v. Collins, SIOU.S.II41 , 1145, 1159(1994). 
